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THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE AND TORT




HERAPEUTIC jurisprudence is a mode of legal analysis that focuses
on the law's potential as a therapeutic agent.I Its premise is that
legal rules should encourage therapeutic outcomes when it is possible
to do so without offending other important normative values. 2 "Therapeutic
jurisprudence simply seeks to focus attention on an often neglected ingredi-
ent in the calculus necessary for performing a sensible policy analysis of
mental health law and practice - the therapeutic dimension - and to call
for a systematic empirical examination of this dimension."' 3 If, for example,
empirical examination reveals that voluntary treatment for mental illness is
more effective than involuntary treatment, 4 the law should encourage volun-
tary treatment and permit involuntary treatment, if at all, only after efforts
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at the Association of American Law School's Annual Meeting in San Antonio, Texas, January
5, 1992. The author gratefully acknowledges a grant from the M.D. Anderson Foundation to
support the preparation of this article. Laura Cushman, Grant Morris, Victoria Palacios,
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1. DAVID B. WEXLER & BRUCE J. WINICK, ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE
(1991); DAVID B. WEXLER, THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A THERAPEUTIC
AGENT ix (1990).
2. WEXLER & WINICK, supra note 1, at xi.
3. Id. This inquiry into the therapeutic dimension of law can be analyzed from four
perspectives. First, the law may play a role in producing psychological dysfunction through
discouragement of necessary treatment, encouragement of unnecessary treatment, and encour-
agement of sick behavior or absence of responsibility. Id. at 19-24. Second, legal rules may
explicitly seek to promote therapeutic consequences as in the case of a right to treatment. Id.
at 24-30. Third, legal procedures may play a therapeutic role in the parties psychological
response to the legal process, as contrasted with the outcome. Id. at 30-33. Fourth, the roles
played by attorneys and judges may have therapeutic consequences for the other actors in the
legal process. Id. at 33-37. This proposal falls within the second perspective.
4. See Mary L. Durham & John Q. LaFond, A Search for the Missing Premise of Invol-
untary Therapeutic Commitment: Effective Treatment of the Mentally I11, 40 RUTGERS L.
REV. 303, 310 (1988); Leonard I. Stein & Mary Ann Test, Alternative to Mental Hospital
Treatment: I. Conceptual Model, Treatment Program, and Clinical Evaluation, 37 ARCHIVES
GEN. PSYCHIATRY 392 (1980); Bruce J. Winick, Competency to Consent to Voluntary Hospital-
ization: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis of Zinermon v. Burch, 14 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIA-
TRY 169 (1991), cited in WEXLER & WINICK, supra note 1, at 83.
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to encourage voluntary treatment have failed. 5 In contrast, if empirical ex-
amination reveals that a physician-patient or psychotherapist-patient privi-
lege does not result in more effective psychotherapy, then it cannot be
justified on therapeutic jurisprudence grounds.6
The insights from therapeutic jurisprudence are particularly relevant to
fault based tort law.7 The goals of fault based tort law are compensation and
deterrence.8 Tort judgments are intended to compensate the injured and to
deter potential injurers from engaging in unsafe conduct. Thus, tort law and
therapeutic jurisprudence share a common agenda, the reduction of injury
and the restoration of the injured. This article will explore the first item of
that common agenda, deterring injury-producing conduct.
The goal of deterrence is, however, compromised by a conjunctive require-
ment of tort law. Only when the two goals of deterrence and compensation
coincide in a case are tort sanctions available. Unreasonably unsafe conduct
that does not result in injury is not subject to tort sanctions, 9 and dangerous
conduct that does not result in significant injury is unlikely to resort in tort
sanctions. 10
The capacity of tort law to shape behavior, even apart from the limitation
on deterrence imposed by this conjunctive requirement, is admittedly prob-
lematic. Tort law standards are imprecise and uncertain."I The mechanism
5. SAMUEL J. BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 178 n. 10 (3d
ed. 1985)
6. DANIEL W. SHUMAN & MYRON F. WEINER, THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT
PRIVILEGE: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION 6 (1987). This research concludes that for the vast
majority of persons the privilege does not play a role in the decision to seek therapy or to
reveal information during therapy. Just because a privilege or other rule cannot be justified on
therapeutic jurisprudence grounds does not necessarily yield the conclusion that the rule is not
justifiable. A psychotherapist-patient privilege that cannot be justified on the utilitarian
grounds that it is necessary for effective therapy might nonetheless be supported by deontologi-
cal concerns with privacy as an important societal value. For a discussion of the therapeutic
potential of Shuman and Weiner's research, see Jeffrey A. Klotz, Limiting the Psychotherapist-
Patient Privilege: The Therapeutic Potential, 27 CRIM. L. BULL. 416, 417 (1991).
7. In negligence and intentional torts, fault based liability is explicit. In strict products
liability, fault is purportedly not a consideration, yet it is not absent from the relevant stan-
dards. Plaintiffs must prove that the product was defective, not merely that they were injured.
In practice, the test for defective products operates much like the test for negligence. See
James A. Henderson & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in Products Liability: An
Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L. REV. 479, 489 (1990). Therefore, strict liabil-
ity notwithstanding, it is appropriate to characterize tort law in the United States as a fault-
based liability system. Moreover, the goal of removing the requirement of proving fault in
strict product liability cases is to enhance its deterrent effect.
8. David G. Owen, Deterrence and Desert in Tort Law: A Comment, 73 CAL. L. REV.
665, 666 (1985); Richard Pierce Jr., Institutional Aspects of Tort Reform, 73 CAL. L. REV. 917,
917 n.1 (1985); Daniel W. Shuman, The Psychology of Deterrence in Tort Law 4 (Mar. 20,
1992) (unpublished manuscript on file with the author).
9. See Barnes v. Bovenmyer, 122 N.W.2d 312, 317 (Iowa 1963).
10. See, e.g., Report of the Harvard Medical Practice Study to the State of New York,
Patients, Doctors and Lawyers: Medical Injury, Malpractice, and Patient Compensation in New
York (1990). This study revealed that fewer than one in eight patients injured by medical
negligence instituted a claim for compensation and that most of the cases in which claims were
not instituted involved small damage claims. Id. at 12.
11. To operate as an effective deterrent, tort law should articulate a clear standard
of appropriate behavior that is then communicated to decisionmakers who can
understand this standard and modify their conduct to avoid the tort sanctions
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through which tort law is thought to affect decisionmaking rests on assump-
tions that lack psychiatric or psychological validation.12 The deterrence
goal of tort law rejects a normative explanation for behavior, in which tort
law plays an informative rather than a coercive role. Tort law assumes,
without inquiry into the literature of psychiatry or psychology, that people
are aware of the potential of tort sanctions and consequently choose safer
behavior to avoid these sanctions. Notwithstanding the practical problems
of whether the deterrence goal of tort law actually works, and the many calls
for adoption of a no fault compensation scheme, 13 fault based tort law re-
mains vital and its demise may be greatly exaggerated. 14 There is a powerful
intuitive appeal to the claim that tort law shapes behavior. As long as fault
based tort liability remains, its potential as a therapeutic agent should not be
ignored. 15
An exploration of the therapeutic potential of tort law suggests an exami-
nation of the relationship between mental or emotional problems and acci-
dents. Do mental or emotional problems play a role in accident causation?
If they do, ameliorating mental and emotional problems may reduce the
number of accidents and consequential injuries. Thus, if tort law can en-
courage appropriate 16 utilization of mental health care, if mental health care
that will otherwise occur. The corpus of tort law in any jurisdiction consists of
settlements, jury verdicts, trials to the court, appellate decisions, statutes, and
administrative rules. This body of law rarely articulates a clear standard of ap-
propriate behavior within a single jurisdiction. Moreover, our federal system of
government results in fifty state and a federal set of rules that are infrequently
the same. Even assuming the ability to predict which set of rules will apply to a
multistate transaction, the ability to predict the outcome of a case based upon
what a jury will do in applying those rules in a particular case is an art not a
science. Thus, tort law is often criticized as increasing rather than decreasing
uncertainty about standards of appropriate behavior.
Shuman, supra note 8, at 7-8 (footnotes omitted).
12. "Deterrence posits a psychological relationship, so it is strange that most analyses of it
have ignored decision makers' emotions, perceptions, and calculations and have instead relied
on deductive logic based on the premise that people are highly rational." Robert Jervis, Intro-
duction: Approach and Assumptions, in PSYCHOLOGY AND DETERRENCE I (Robert Jervis ed.,
1985). (Jervis' observations about deterrence focus on its application to international conflict;
however, this observation is equally perceptive concerning the role of deterrence in tort law.)
13. JEFFERY O'CONNELL, THE INJURY INDUSTRY AND THE REMEDY OF No FAULT
INSURANCE 94-105 (1971); Stephen B. Sugerman, Doing Away With Tort Law, 73 CAL. L.
REV. 555, 659-64 (1985).
14. With apologies to Samuel Clemens.
15. The effort to transform fault based tort law into a no fault compensation system has
been criticized, among other grounds, on the basis that any possibility of effective deterrence
would be lost. Craig Brown, Deterrence in Tort and No-Fault: The New Zealand Experience,
73 CAL. L. REV. 976, 976-77 (1985); Thomas A. Ford, The Fault With "No Fault", 61 A.B.A.
J. 1071, 1072 (1975); Elisabeth M. Landes, Insurance, Liability, and Accidents: A Theoretical
and Empirical Investigation of the Effects of No-Fault Insurance, 25 J.L. & ECON. 49, 50, 57-65
(1982).
16. Research on medical care has revealed that one out of every hundred hospitalized
patients is injured as the result of negligent medical care. Report Harvard Medical Practice
Study to the State of New York, Patients, Doctors, and Lawyers: Medical Injury, Malpractice
Litigation, and Patient Compensation in New York (1990). Because diagnosis and treatment




is effective in treating mental or emotional problems, 17 and if ameliorating
mental or emotional problems can reduce the number of accidents, the acci-
dent reduction goals of tort law and therapeutic jurisprudence coalesce to
support that result.
II. THE RELATIONSHIP OF ACCIDENTAL INJURY AND
MENTAL OR EMOTIONAL PROBLEMS
Tort law doctrine and scholarship have largely ignored the psychology of
deterrence, why people behave the way they do and how tort law shapes
behavior.' 8 Instead, economic analysis has dominated the examination of
the impact of tort law based upon an unverified assumption that people act
rationally and that the object of that rational behavior is the accumulation of
wealth. 19 Thus, it is not surprising that the impact of tort law on the men-
tally ill has also been largely ignored. 20
There is a developing body of legal scholarship on the impact of tort liabil-
ity on those who treat the mentally ill.21 Ironically, the therapeutic conse-
quences of tort liability on the mentally ill has escaped direct scrutiny.22
This approach sends an implicit message that reinforces a model of learned
helplessness for mentally ill persons. It teaches that the locus of control for
mentally ill persons is external rather than internal. 23 To address the
problems of the clients each profession is intended to serve, the legal profes-
sion focuses on the problems of the mental health profession, without di-
rectly addressing the client/patient's interests.24 The appropriate inquiry
17. The demand for cost-effective treatments by third party payors has generated substan-
tial outcome research for mental health care. One type of care that has generated a massive
amount of research is psychotherapy. See, e.g., Nathan B. Epstein & Louis A. Vlok, Research
on the Results of Psychotherapy: A Summary of Evidence, 138 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1027
(1981); Perry London & Gerald Klerman, Evaluating Psychotherapy, 139 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
709 (1982). While significant methodological difficulties plague the research on this question,
there seems to be general agreement from this research that psychotherapy may be effective in
treating individuals suffering from nonpsychotic depression or moderate anxieties. Beyond
that there is a divergence of opinion.
18. Shuman, supra note 8.
19. See, e.g., GuiDo CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS 24-30 (1970); WILLIAM
LANDES & RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987); R. H.
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcON. 1 (1960).
20. James W. Ellis, Tort Responsibility of Mentally Disabled Persons, 1981 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 1079, 1079-81 (1981).
21. See David B. Wexler & Robert F. Schopp, How and When to Correct for Juror Hind-
sight Bias in Mental Health Malpractice Litigation: Some Preliminary Observations, 7 BEHAV.
SCI. & L. 485 (1989); David B. Wexler & Robert F. Schopp, Shooting Yourself in the Foot with
Due Care: Psychotherapists and Crystallized Standards of Tort Liability, 17 J. PSYCHIATRY &
L. 13 (1989).
22. Even in articles that do address the therapeutic consequences of tort law, the interests
of the client/patient are addressed indirectly, as a function of the law's impact on the mental
health professional. See Robert F. Schopp, The Psychotherapist's Duty to Protect the Public:
The Appropriate Standard and the Foundation in Legal Theory and Empirical Premises, 70
NEB. L. REV. 327 (1991).
23. See discussion of attribution theory, infra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
24. Although there are a number of articles that address the tort liability of the mentally
ill, they tend to focus on whether it is consistent with fault based tort liability. See James Barr
Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L. REV. 97, 99-100 (1908); Francis H. Bohlen, Liability in
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ought to consider the therapeutic consequence of tort liability on the men-
tally ill. The sensible premise of therapeutic jurisprudence suggests that if
mental illness plays a role in accident causation, tort liability rules should,
whenever possible to do so without offending other important normative val-
ues, encourage and support voluntary, efficacious treatment.
25
The suggestion that the accident reduction goals of tort law and therapeu-
tic jurisprudence coalesce points to an exploration of the role of mental ill-
ness in accidents. It is often assumed, but has less often been the subject of
careful investigation, that there is a linkage between mental illness and acci-
dents, particularly automobile accidents. 26 The potential impact of this
linkage is significant given the human and economic cost of accidents and
the extent of mental illness in our society. The direct and indirect cost of
accidents in the United States, one-fifth of which involve motor vehicles, is
estimated to be 175.9 billion dollars per year.27 Current estimates of the
level of individuals in the United States who suffer from a mental disorder
are at fourteen percent of the population. 28 Additionally, research suggests
that certain categories of mentally ill individuals have lower rates of acci-
dents after treatment. 2
9
Notwithstanding this assumption, there is good reason to question the
linkage between mental illness and accidents. The frequency with which the
mentally ill cause accidents, at least as reflected in one crude indicator, ap-
pellate caselaw, does not suggest that seriously mentally ill persons account
for a disproportionate number of accidents. 30 More directly, recent accident
Tort of Infants and Insane Persons, 23 MICH. L. REV. 9, 31-34 (1924); William B. Hornblower,
Insanity and the Law of Negligence, 5 COLUM. L. REV. 278, 278 (1905). These articles are not
concerned with the way the mentally ill might behave in light of these rules.
25. See Durham & LaFond, Stein & Test, and Winick, supra note 4.
26. Laura A. Cushman et al., Psychiatric Disorders and Motor Vehicle Accidents, 67
PSYCHOL. REP. 483, 484 (1990).
27. DEBORAH F. HENSLER ET AL., COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTAL INJURIES IN THE
UNITED STATES 1 (Rand 1991).
28. Cushman, supra note 26, at 486-87. Some estimate that at any given time, one in four
Americans suffers from depression, anxiety, or other emotional disorders. The President's
Commission on Mental Health (1978). The extent of the problem is revealed in the fact that
Valium and Librium are the most frequently prescribed drugs throughout the world. L.F.
Rittelmeyer, Minor Tranquilizers: Prescribing Practices of Primary Care Physicians, 23 PsY-
CHOSOMATICS 223, 226 (1982).
29. Robert C. Eelkmena et al., A Statistical Study on the Relationship Between Mental
Illness and Traffic Accidents - A Pilot Study, 60 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 459. 460 (1970).
Although individuals in the study discharged from a state hospital had a higher rate of acci-
dents than a comparable group of individuals in the population who were not diagnosed as
mentally ill, the groups labeled as psychotics and psychoneurotic had reduced rates of acci-
dents following treatment. Those labeled as alcoholics and personality disorder sufferers did
not respond as favorably. Id. at 461. The finding that accident rates of alcoholics and persons
suffering from personality disorders were not reduced after hospitalization corresponds with
Gottfredson and Hirschi's findings that criminal behavior and noncriminal behavior such as
accidents can be explained as a lack of self-control caused by ineffective child rearing.
MICHAEL R. GOIrFREDSON & TRAVIS HIRSCHI, A GENERAL THEORY OF CRIME 91-97
(1990).
30. William J. Curran, Tort Liability of the Mentally Ill and Mentally Deficient, 21 OHIO
ST. L.J. 52, 64 (1960). Curran's survey of the case law as of 1960 reveals few cases in which a
tort "insanity defense" was raised. Accepting the accuracy of this survey, it is far from clear
whether this is a valid indicator of the frequency with which the mentally ill cause accidents.
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research questions the linkage between mental illness and the rate of auto-
mobile accidents. 31 Moreover, mental illness may serve as a screening factor
to exclude people from positions of risk creation. Mental illness is a ground
to deny or suspend a license to practice law,32 medicine,33 and psychology.34
Additionally, mental illness is a ground to deny or suspend a license to oper-
ate a motor vehicle. 35 Mental illness is a also a practical disqualifying factor
in business. Acting crazy in a working environment quickly excludes one
from the business world.
Therefore, the therapeutic potential of tort law is likely to be limited if
focused exclusively on those who suffer from major mental illness. To
achieve a broader impact, concern with the therapeutic impact of tort law
should not be limited to those suffering from major mental illness, but
should include the walking wounded.36 All humans confront powerlessness
and the inevitability of death, regardless of race, class or gender. Our re-
sponse to the loss of a job or the death of a loved one may fade with time and
It may be that mentally ill people commit torts with lesser frequency than those who are not
mentally ill; it may be that mentally ill people commit torts with the same frequency as those
who are not mentally ill but have fewer assets or insurance and are therefore sued less often; it
may be that mentally ill people commit torts with the same frequency as those who are not
mentally ill but that insurance companies settle rather than litigate these cases; or, it may be
that mentally ill people who are sued fail to raise their illness as a defense because courts have
not been receptive to this argument. Thus, appellate case law is not necessarily a reliable
indicator of the nexus between mental illness and accident causation.
31. Cushman, supra note 26, at 487. Cushman's study of accident victims found that the
percentage with psychiatric diagnoses was lower than national estimates of the percentage of
the population thought subject to these diagnoses; individuals with psychiatric diagnoses were
not involved in single-car accidents (where suicide might be a likely explanation) with a greater
frequency than those who did have a psychiatric diagnosis; and, individuals with psychiatric
diagnoses were not cited more often for inattention or failure to yield the right of way. Id. at
486-87. See also J. Isherwood et al., Life Event Stress, Psychosocial Factors, Suicide Attempt
and Auto-Accident Proclivity, 26 J. PSYCHOSOMATIC RES. 371 (1982) (study analyzing assoca-
tion between life event stress and suicide attempts as well as auto accidents). This research
parallels the research addressing another myth about the mentally ill, that they are more dan-
gerous than non-mentally ill persons. See Michael Perlin, On "Sanism ", 46 SMU L. REV. 373,(1992). Although that research focuses on intentional rather than negligent acts, both findings
dispel myths that we should be more fearful of harm at the hands of the mentally ill. Linda A.
Teplin, The Criminality of the Mentally Ill: A Dangerous Misconception, 142 AM. J. PSYCHIA-
TRY 593, 595 (1985).
32. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 82.027(b)(2) (Vernon 1988).
33. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4495b, § 3.08(16) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
34. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4512c, § I l(d)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
35. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6687b, § 4(5) & (7) (Vernon Supp. 1992). Although
mental illness or incapacity remains a ground to deny or suspend a driver's license, procedures
that do not provide the driver a timely hearing and opportunity to be heard on this issue have
been found unconstitutional. Freitag v. Carter, 489 F.2d 1377, 1382 (7th Cir. 1973); Jones v.
Penny, 387 F. Supp. 383, 394-95 (M.D.N.C. 1974).
Those mentally ill persons who are involuntarily hospitalized or found incompetent may be
automatically denied driving privileges. BRAKEL, supra note 5, at 493-505. It is not at all
clear, however, that the walking wounded, those with minor mental or emotional problems,
report these problems to the appropriate state agencies of their own volition or that these
problems are reported by their therapists.
36. Others have referred to what I understand to be the same group as the worried well.
See, e.g., Epstein & Vlok, supra note 17, at 1034; James E. Barrett et al., The Prevalence of




escape diagnosis as a major mental illness.37 Nonetheless, its impact may be
profound. At a minimum, it may affect our concentration and responsive-
ness. Inclusion of the walking wounded in a discussion of the therapeutic
impact of tort law is sound both in terms of expanding the therapeutic po-
tential of tort law and in light of the current research on stress.
Research seeking to identify the characteristics of accident-prone drivers
initially focused on physical and psychological characteristics viewed as sta-
ble.38 This research suggested a correlation between auto accidents and
psychosocial variables such as aggressiveness, depression, and social malad-
justment. 39 However, the inability of these variables to explain accident
rates for individual drivers over time indicated the limitations of the research
that suggested accident proneness was a stable characteristic of certain driv-
ers. 4° In addition, research has dispelled the fiction that removing the myth-
ical five percent of the drivers who cause fifty percent of the accidents would
have a significant impact on the total number of automobile accidents. 41
These findings led to research focusing on the relationship of accident
rates to life events (i.e., change in marital status, change in employment sta-
tus, change in financial status), the degree of adjustment such events require,
and the subjective stress experienced from these changes. 42 This research
37. For example, AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION'S DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTI-
CAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 217 (3d ed. revised 1987) (DSM-III-R) describes the
diagnostic criteria for a Major Depressive Episode to include a depressed mood or loss of
interest in virtually all activities for at least two weeks. However, the diagnostic criteria ex-
cludes individuals who experience normal reactions to losing a loved one. Id. at 218-19. A
depressed mood or loss of interest in all activities is considered a normal reaction to such an
event and is not considered a mental disorder if, for example, it only lasts for a matter of
months. Id. at 360-61.
38. See Fleming James, Jr. & John J. Dickinson, Accident Proneness and Accident Law, 63
HARV. L. REV. 769, 772-75 (1950).
39. MORRIS S. SCHULZINGER, THE ACCIDENT SYNDROME, 14-15 (1956); A.E. Suchman,
Cultural and Social Factors in Accident Occurrence and Control, 7 J. OccuP. MED. 487, 488
(1965); Stanford G. Wrogg, The Role of Emotions in Industrial Accidents, 3 ARCHIVES ENV.
HEALTH 519 (1961).
40. D.H. Schuster & J.P. Guilford, The Psychometric Prediction of Problem Drivers, 6
HUM. FACTORS 393 (1964).
41. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION DRIVER-BEHAVIOR AND ACCIDENT INVOLVE-
MENT: IMPLICATIONS FOR TORT LIABILITY 75 (1970).
42. These events are described in Thomas H. Holmes & Richard R. Rahe, The Social
Readjustment Rating Scale, 11 J. PSYCHOSOMATIC RES. 213, 216 (1967):
Rank Life Event Mean Value
1 Death of spouse 100
2 Divorce 73
3 Marital separation 65
4 Jail Term 63
5 Death of close family member 63
6 Personal injury or illness 53
7 Marriage 50
8 Fired at work 47
9 Marital reconciliation 45
10 Retirement 45
11 Change in health of family member 44
12 Pregnancy 40
13 Sex difficulties 39
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pointed to a significant correlation between life changes, subjective stress,
and accident rates.43 Transient situational stress, which everyone may expe-
rience at some point in their lives, is currently regarded as a significant factor
in accident causation. "These studies suggest that recent life events (e.g.,
birth of a child, divorce, death of a friend or relative, change of job, financial
change) that bring about a significant change in an individual's ongoing life
pattern may cause psychological turmoil that can exacerbate the risk of acci-
dent or illness."" From the perspective of therapeutic jurisprudence and
the accident reduction goal of tort law, the correlation between stress and
accidents points away from an exclusive focus on those who suffer from a
major mental illness, such as schizophrenia, and toward inclusion of the
walking wounded - individuals whose life changes and subjective response to
14 Gain of new family member 39
15 Business readjustment 39
16 Change in financial state 38
17 Death of close friend 37
18 Change to different line of work 36
19 Change in number of arguments with spouse 35
20 Mortgage over $10,000 31
21 Foreclosure of mortgage or loan 30
22 Change in responsibilities at work 29
23 Son or daughter leaving home 29
24 Trouble with in-laws 29
25 Outstanding personal achievement 28
26 Wife begin or stop work 26
27 Begin or end school 26
28 Change in living conditions 25
29 Revision of personal habits 24
30 Trouble with boss 23
31 Change in work hours or conditions 20
32 Change in residence 20
33 Change in schools 20
34 Change in recreation 19
35 Change in church activities 19
36 Change in social activities 18
37 Mortgage or loan less than $10,000 17
38 Change in sleeping habits 16
39 Change in number of family get-togethers 15
40 Change in eating habits 15
41 Vacation 13
42 Christmas 12
43 Minor violations of the law 11
43. L. McMurray, Emotional Stress and Driving Performance: The Effect of Divorce, I
BEHAV. RES. IN HIGHWAY SAFETY 100 (1970) (accident rates for individuals in divorce pro-
ceedings were doubled in the six months preceding and following the date of the divorce);
Melvin L. Seizer et al., Fatal Accidents: The Role of Psychopathology, Social Stress, and Acute
Disturbance, 124 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1028, 1029 (1968) (fifty-two percent of drivers found at
fault in fatal automobile accidents had previously experienced interpersonal, employment, or
financial stresses as contrasted with eighteen percent of the control group); Melvin L. Seizer &
Amiram Vinokur, Life Events, Subjective Stress, and Traffic Accidents, 131 AM. J. PSYCHIA-
TRY 903, 904-05 (1974) (demographic and personality variables were not statistically signifi-
cantly correlated with accident causation as contrasted with life changes and subjective stress,
i.e., serious disturbance with spouse of parents, serious pressure on the job or at school, serious
financial disturbance).
44. James C. Helmkamp & Craig M. Bone, The Effect of Time in a New Job on Hospitali-
zation Rates for Accidents and Injuries in the U.S. Navy, 1977 through 1983, 29 J. OCCUPA-
TIONAL MED. 653, 658 (1987).
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stress significantly reduce their concentration or responsiveness. 45
The magnitude of this problem is illustrated by recent research on stress
and professions. A level of emotional discomfort seems to be a consequence
of professional career choices. In research conducted in the 1980s during
the boom market for attorneys, Benjamin, Kaszniak, Sales, and Shanfield
found in an Arizona study that prospective law students' levels of depression
were comparable to that found in the general population of three to nine
percent.46 By late spring of the first year of law school thirty-two percent of
the law students reported that they were depressed, and by the third year
forty percent of the students reported that they were depressed.4 7 Two years
following graduation from law school, seventeen percent reported that they
were depressed. A subsequent study of practicing attorneys in the state of
Washington by Benjamin, Darling, and Sales found that nineteen percent of
the lawyers reported depression. 48 Although major mental illness may ex-
clude people from practicing law, medicine, or psychology, participating in
these activities may create a level of stress that is positively correlated with
the risk of injury.49
III. A LIMITED SUBJECTIVE STANDARD OF CARE
How does tort law respond to this understanding of accident causation?
Does tort law ask only that we do the best we can? Is mental illness or
transient situational stress factored into the evaluation of a defendant's tort
liability? Contract law recognizes mental illness as an exculpatory condi-
tion under the label of contractual capacity.50 Criminal law recognizes
mental illness as an exculpatory condition under an insanity defense, nega-
tion of intent, or diminished capacity. 5 1 In contrast, tort law does not recog-
nize mental illness as an exculpatory condition. With a single exception,
American jurisdictions refuse to take the defendant's mental illness or other
emotional problems into account in formulating the relevant standard of
care in tort cases. 52 Holmes' classic exposition of this position is often cited
as the justification for the objective standard of care in American tort law.
45. See, e.g., David DuBois et al., Accident Reduction Through Stress Management, 1 J.
Bus. & PSYCHOL. 5 (1986).
46. G. Andrew H. Benjamin et al., The Role of Legal Education in Producing Psychologi-
cal Distress Among Law Students, AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 225, 225 (1986). See also Lennart
Levi, Occupational Stress: Spice of Life or Kiss of Death?, 45 AM. PSYCHOL. 1142, 1142 (1990).
47. Benjamin, supra note 46, at 236.
48. G. Andrew H. Benjamin et al., The Prevalence of Depression, Alcohol, and Cocaine
Abuse Among United States Lawyers, 13 INT'L. J. L. AND PSYCHIATRY 233, 240 (1990).
49. The effects of professional stress are certainly not limited to the practice of law. One
state wide study of admission records of community mental health centers found a dispropor-
tion percentage of hospital and health care workers experiencing mental health problems.
Michael J. Colligan et al., Occupational Incidence Rates of Mental Health Disorders, 3 J. HUM.
STRESS 34, 36 (1977).
50. DANIEL W. SHUMAN, PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EVIDENCE 361 (1986).
51. Id. at 273-78.
52. Hudnall v. Sellner, 800 F.2d 377, 384 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1069
(1987); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 283(B) (1965). "Unless the actor is a child, his
insanity or other mental deficiency does not relieve the actor from liability for conduct which
does not conform to the standard of a reasonable man under like circumstances." Id.
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The standards of the law are standards of general application. The law
takes no account of the infinite varieties of temperament, intellect, and
education which make the internal character of a given act so different
in different men. It does not attempt to see men as God sees them, for
more than one sufficient reason. In the first place, the impossibility of
nicely measuring a man's powers and limitations is far clearer than that
of ascertaining his knowledge of law, which has been thought to ac-
count for what is called the presumption that every man knows the law.
But a more satisfactory explanation is, that, when men live in society, a
certain average of conduct, a sacrifice of individual peculiarities going
beyond a certain point, is necessary to the general welfare. If, for in-
stance, a man is born hasty and awkward, is always having accidents
and hurting himself and his neighbors, no doubt his congenital defects
will be allowed for in the courts of Heaven, but his slips are no less
troublesome to his neighbors than if they sprang from guilty neglect.
His neighbors accordingly require him, at his proper peril, to come up
to their standard, and the courts which they establish decline to take his
personal equation into account.53
Holmes justified the objective standard on the grounds of problems of mea-
suring individual capacities and the right to expect a minimal level of care
from one's neighbors. Others have noted as reasons advanced in favor of the
rule that as between the plaintiff and defendant, the party who caused the
loss should be required to compensate for the resulting harm; feared logisti-
cal problems of administering a civil insanity defense; encouraging greater
care by guardians of the mentally ill; and, the risk of eroding the objective
standard of care.54
Although tort law takes the physical illness of defendants into account by
judging the conduct of physically disabled defendants against other similarly
disabled persons, the conduct of mentally ill defendants is judged against
those who do not suffer from a similar disability.55 Interestingly, many of
the arguments against a subjective standard of care apply with equal force in
the case of physically ill defendants. Specifically, the argument that as be-
tween the plaintiff and defendant, the party who caused the loss should be
required to compensate for the resulting harm, does not suggest a distinction
in the standard of care for physically and mentally incapacitated defend-
ants.56 Thus, the argument that it is necessary to maintain the dichotomy
between a subjective standard for the physically incapacitated and an objec-
tive standard for the mentally incapacitated to serve the goal of compensat-
ing innocent plaintiffs is unconvincing.
The objective standard of care has been consistently criticized in the aca-
53. O.W. HOLMES JR., THE COMMON LAW 86-87 (1963).
54. James B. Ellis, Tort Responsibility of Mentally Disabled Persons, 1981 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 1079, 1083-84 (1981). See also William J. Curran, Tort Liability of the Mentally Ill and
Deficient, 21 OHIO ST. L.J. 52, 54 (1960).
55. Warren A. Seavey, Negligence: Subjective or Objective?, 41 HARv. L. REV. 1, 13-14
(1927).
56. Ultimately the roots of the distinction may be found in society's unfounded myths
about the mentally ill. See Perlin, supra note 31.
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demic literature as conceptually unsound in a fault based liability system.57
Prior to the 19th century, when strict liability dominated tort law and the
morally laden concept of fault was largely irrelevant to the determination of
liability, it may have been logical to measure the behavior of the mentally ill
and non-mentally ill by a single standard. However, in the fault-based sys-
tem of liability that evolved in the 19th century, the single standard raises a
troubling moral quandary.
Recognizing this moral quandary, I nonetheless accept the objective stan-
dard of care, with the limitations noted later, although I do not accept the
reasons traditionally given for the objective standard.58 The objective stan-
dard of care is a therapeutic agent. It encourages a therapeutic result by
stating to the mentally ill and walking wounded that they cannot rely on
their mental or emotional problems to avoid responsibility for their behavior
or failure to initiate treatment. 59 A response from one psychotherapist,
questioned about data involving mental illness and accidents, explained in
vivid terms the therapeutic potential of the objective standard of care: "I
hate it when you legal people interfere with the only proven motivator for
the mentally ill to seek treatment because they realize that they are people
responsible for their actions like everyone else.' '6° If the mentally ill and
walking wounded behave, as the deterrence theorists of tort law posit, like
the normal population behave and rely on the threat of tort sanctions to
shape their actions, 6 1 then the objective standard of care encourages them to
57. See Ellis, supra note 54; Curran, supra note 54.
58. The argument that a subjective judgment measuring individual capacity is unworkable
is a smoke screen. Tort law regularly makes subjective judgments about individual capacity in
other contexts. For example, tort law makes subjective judgments about the degree of impair-
ment a plaintiff has suffered and the pain and suffering the plaintiff experienced. The argument
that the party who was injured through no fault of his or her own should be compensated is
more troubling. One response, which I do not find particularly satisfying, is that there are
always tradeoffs in achieving any beneficial result in the law. A more satisfying response to
this concern points in the direction of the wisdom implicit in comparative fault that accidents
are rarely caused exclusively by one party. Thus, the example of the plaintiff injured without
his or her own fault is a chimera. See also George J. Alexander & Thomas S. Szasz, Mental
Illness as an Excuse for Civil Wrongs, 43 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 24, 33 (1967) (arguing in
favor of holding the mentally ill liable for their torts on libertarian grounds).
59. Stephen J. Morse, Crazy Behavior, Moral, and Mental Health Law, 51 S. CAL. L.
REV. 527 (1978); John T. Monahan, Abolish the Insanity Defense?-Not Yet, 26 RUTGERS L.
REV. 719 (1973). See also David B. Wexler, Inducing Therapeutic Compliance Through the
Criminal Law, 14 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 43 (1990) (the author relies on research that has found
that recidivists with known, treatable low serotonin levels are correlated with higher rates of
recidivism, to argue that defendants should be subject to enhanced punishment for failure to
avail themselves of treatment).
60. Telephone Interview with anonymous psychotherapist (Oct. 1991). This response
may be explained in alternate ways. It may be that the psychotherapist is simply describing a
clinical observation that mentally ill people who have sought treatment with this therapist
have mentioned that concern with legal responsibility for their actions is a reason for seeking
therapy. Alternatively, it may be that the psychotherapist is expressing a personal concern
with malpractice liability that translates as, "do not exculpate the mentally ill; rather, hold
them, not their therapists, solely responsible for their conduct and not as the court did in
Tarasoff." See Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
61. Shuman, supra note 8. Beyond the problems that all individuals have in learning
about and using tort law in their decisions, the potential impact of mental illness on cognitive
and volitional capacity presents a more serious challenge to the deterrent goal of tort law.
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behave responsibly and seek treatment.
Research from numerous psychological perspectives supports the conclu-
sion that a person's perception of free choice and responsibility for behavior
has a significant impact upon that behavior. 62 One explanation comes from
attribution theory which explains that people behave according to their per-
ception and understanding of events. "[A]ttributions affect our feelings
about past events and our expectations about future ones, our attitudes to-
ward other persons and our reactions to their behavior, and our conceptions
of ourselves and our efforts to improve our fortunes."' 63 For example, a stu-
dent who attributes her failure on an exam to low ability, over which she has
no control, is less likely to put substantial effort into the class than a student
who attributes her failure to lack of effort, over which she has control.64 The
impact of attribution theory is not limited to normal people. In particular,
attribution theory's focus on "learned helpless," attributing success or fail-
ure to forces outside of ourselves, has relevance to behavior across diagnostic
categories. The import of attribution theory and numerous other psycholog-
ical perspectives is that not excusing people from tort liability for their
mental or emotional problems encourages them to take greater responsibility
for their actions. This is revisionist therapeutic jurisprudence at its best. So
far, so good.
But what of the mentally ill and walking wounded who respond to this
therapeutic incentive and seek treatment which has not yet achieved its de-
sired result? How are those who are still in treatment - the uncured -
regarded by tort law? Tort law is, at best, indifferent to a defendant's efforts
to receive mental health care. Seeking help does not reduce tort law's expec-
tations of the defendant. 65 The mentally ill and walking wounded who are
aware of their mental health problems and pursue treatment are held to the
same standard as those who are aware of their mental health problems and
refuse to pursue treatment. A defendant who has instituted a course of
treatment for mental or emotional problems, has complied fully with the
prescribed treatment regime, and has become preoccupied with problems
raised during psychotherapy resulting in reduced concentration or respon-
siveness while driving which, in turn, causes an accident, is judged according
to the objective standard without regard to the treatment efforts. Tort de-
fendants receive no extra credit for extra effort in seeking treatment.
62. Monahan, supra note 59, at 721. Monahan discusses research from the locus of con-
trol, cognitive dissonance, attribution, achievement motivation, personal causation, reactance,
and perceived control theories that support this conclusion. Id. at 721-22.
63. H.H. Kelley & J.L. Michela, Attribution Theory and Research, 31 ANN. REV.
PSYCHOL. 457, 489 (1980).
64. Sandra Graham, Communicating Low Ability in the Classroom: Bad Things Good
Teachers Sometimes Do, in ATTRIBUTION THEORY: APPLICATIONS TO ACHIEVEMENT,
MENTAL HEALTH, AND INTERPERSONAL CONFLICT 17 (Sandra Graham & Valerie S. Folkes
eds., 1990).
65. Seeking help may actually increase tort law's expectations for the defendant. As dis-
cussed infra notes 79-80 and accompanying text, knowledge gained through diagnosis or treat-
ment of a mental health problem may increase the defendant's awareness of the risks posed by
the illness and require the defendant to act with reference to that increased knowledge.
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There are two responses to this criticism. Each response points to thera-
peutic benefits of the objective standard's indifference to treatment efforts.
The first approach is tough love for tortfeasers. "Get better, no excuses ac-
cepted," may be a more powerful, albeit less nurturing motivator, than one
which leaves the door open to excuses. Tort law takes a "no excuses ac-
cepted" approach in strict products liability.66 The deterrent rationale for
strict products liability rejects a good faith defense on the ground that it
encourages the highest possible level of care.67 By analogy, because best
efforts at treatment do not count in tort law, people may be encouraged to
seek out the most effective mental health treatment and comply fully with
prescribed treatment regimes. Only successful outcomes are rewarded, not
best efforts.
Another response to this criticism of no extra credit for seeking treatment
is that tort law's indifference to treatment efforts may have therapeutic bene-
fits by failing to reinforce learned helpless. Labeling those who seek treat-
ment as less responsible for their tortious behavior could teach these
individuals to behave less responsibly. Both the no excuses accepted and the
avoidance of learned helplessness approach are, superficially, plausible revi-
sionist rationales for tort law's indifference to treatment efforts. The prob-
lem with these rationales only becomes apparent when mental health
treatment is examined more closely.
The failure to factor treatment efforts into the standard of care can be
justified on therapeutic jurisprudence grounds only if the patient's good faith
participation in treatment is the sine qua non of efficacious treatment. Pa-
tient cooperation in treatment is extremely important, but the failure to fac-
tor treatment efforts into the standard of care can be justified only if patient
cooperation is not merely a necessary but also a sufficient condition of effica-
cious treatment. That approach encapsulates the magic pill approach to
health care. Health care professionals have a safe, quick, and effective treat-
ment for mental health problems. All a patient need do to be effectively
treated is to follow the doctor's orders.
Application of the magic pill construct to the treatment of mental or emo-
tional problems may be based, in part, upon a flawed analogy to the treat-
ment of physical illness. There may be a tendency to think of treatment for
mental or emotional problems based on a model of a common available
treatment for physical illness that is quick and effective when the patient
follows the doctor's orders. To the extent that a magical medical pill for
physical illness exists, it is the use of antibiotics to treat acute bacterial infec-
tions.68 The magical medical pill exists; the patient need only take it as pre-
66. "The rule is one of strict liability, making the seller subject to liability to the user or
consumer even though he has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of the
product." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. a. (1965).
67. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944) (Traynor, J.,
concurring).
68. The chemicals used to treat specific microorganisms in infectious diseases are often
referred to as antibiotics, antimicrobic, and chemotherapeutic agents. Lowell S. Young, Anti-
microbial Therapy, in TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE 1596 (James B. Wyngaarden et al. eds., 19th
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scribed to be effectively treated. The application of this construct to the
treatment of mental or emotional problems, however, is flawed for two
reasons.
First, the treatment model based on physical illness is itself flawed in that
it incorrectly assumes that certain common, available treatments of physical
disorders are representative of the universe of treatment for physical disor-
ders. This error corresponds to cognitive psychology's availability heuris-
tic.69 Although the responsiveness of some treatments for physical illnesses
that we call to mind is direct and immediate when the patient follows the
doctor's orders, that model is not descriptive of the universe of treatments
for physical illness. The use of chemotherapy to treat certain cancers may
extend over a significant time period and its long term efficacy is often un-
clear.70 The efficacy of organ transplantation may be unclear for an ex-
tended period of time.71 Uncertainty abounds in the treatment of physical
illness. HIV is a sobering reminder of the limits of medicine's ability to treat
physical illness and of our expectation that medicine should and will develop
a magic pill to protect us from the effects of catastrophic illness. Thus, it is
inaccurate to characterize the treatment model, even for physical illness, as
direct and immediate with its efficacy turning exclusively on patient
compliance.
Second, there is a tendency to assume that mental illness does or should
respond to treatment in similar fashion to the flawed model of treatment for
physical illness. As in the case of physical illness, the benefits of treatment
for mental illness are not often direct or immediate and do not turn exclu-
sively on patient cooperation. 72 Psychotherapy is commonly used to treat
mental illness or disorder. Beyond the consensus that psychotherapy is ef-
fective for the treatment of nonpsychotic depression or moderate anxieties,
however, there is not a consensus about its efficacy. 73
Even when psychotherapy is an effective treatment, the benefits of therapy
are not necessarily linear.7 4 Psychotherapy typically entails exploration of
ed. 1991). The greatest success in the use of these agents has occurred in the treatment of
acute bacterial infections. Id
69. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency
and Probability, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel
Kahneman et al. eds., 1982).
70. I CANCER: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF ONCOLOGY 278 (Vincent T. DeVita, Jr. et
al. eds., 3d ed. 1989).
71. II THE KIDNEY 2344 (Barry M. Brenner & Floyd C. Rector, Jr. eds., 4th ed. 1991).
72. The argument that treatment of mental illness is or should be immediate may superfi-
cially be fueled by Single Session Therapy (SST). See MOSHE TALMON, SINGLE-SESSION
THERAPY: MAXIMIZING THE EFFECT OF THE FIRST (AND OFTEN ONLY) THERAPEUTIC EN-
COUNTER 1-3 (1990). SST is a new approach to psychotherapy that posits that a single session
may be as beneficial as multiple sessions for most patients. Apart from the question of long
term outcome research for SST, its underlying premise is not that treatment is immediately
effective, but rather that given the limited capacity of lengthy therapy to address many psycho-
logical problems, one session is no worse that one hundred sessions and patients will often not
return for more than the initial session.
73. See Epstein & Veok, supra note 17; London & Klerman, supra note 17.
74. A psychoanalytic explanation for this phenomenon focuses on resistance. The work
of analysis in uncovering repressed pathology is threatening to the patient and is expected to
[Vol. 46
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE
painful issues that the patient has repressed. The amount of pain associated
with these issues is likely to be positively correlated with the importance of
addressing these issues in therapy. Exploration of these repressed issues may
result in the patient feeling worse before feeling better. Short term bad feel-
ings induced or exacerbated by psychotherapy are likely to affect concentra-
tion or responsiveness. Thus, psychotherapy that is effective in the long
term may nonetheless increase the risk of accidental injury in the short term.
Another common treatment for mental illness or disorder is the use of
psychopharmacological agents, psychoactive drugs. Treatment of mental ill-
ness or disorder with psychopharmacological agents, the treatment of choice
for schizophrenic and affective disorders, 75 for example, presents a host of
problems that may increase the risk of accidental injuries. 76 Not all individ-
uals treated with psychopharmacological agents for these illnesses respond
to these medications. For example, approximately twenty-five percent of
schizophrenic patients have significant symptoms on traditional neuroleptic
medications. 7" Even for those individuals who do respond to these medica-
tions, psychopharmacological treatment often requires an adjustment of
medication over time.78 Individuals respond differently to medication. The
recommended dose may be too small and fail to ameliorate the symptoms of
the illness, or too large and cause unintended decrease in cognitive function.
If tort law is to encourage a therapeutic outcome it must acknowledge and
accommodate these consequences of treatment.
The failure to factor treatment efforts into the standard of care cannot be
justified on therapeutic jurisprudence grounds. Patients good faith partici-
pation in treatment is a necessary but not a sufficient condition of efficacious
treatment. Mental health professionals do not have safe, quick, and effective
treatments for all mental health problems. Good faith on the part of the
patient will not invariably lead to a beneficial therapeutic outcome and, even
when it ultimately does, it may result in a short term increase in the risk of
accidental injury. If tort law is to be realistic in its support of patient efforts
to receive efficacious treatment it must factor into the legal response a recog-
nition that notwithstanding the patient's complete cooperation, treatment
will not invariably make things better and may make things worse.
Those who respond to the objective standard's therapeutic incentive and
receive a thorough psychiatric or psychological diagnosis fare even worse
cause the patient to invoke a host of defenses to resist therapeutic progress. Working through
the resistance is at the core of the analytic process. Robert L. Stewart, Psychoanalysis and
Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy, in II COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY/IV 1343
(Harold I. Kaplan & Benjamin J. Sadock eds., 4th ed. 1985).
75. Schizophrenic disorders are typically treated with antipsychotic medications, which
do not cure the disorder, but suppress the symptoms. W. REID, TREATMENT OF THE DSM-
III PSYCHIATRIC DISORDERS 13 (1983). Affective disorders are typically treated with tricyclic
or tetracyclic antidepressants. Id. at 129-35.
76. Gerry Oster et al., Benzodiazepine Tranquilizers and the Risk of Accidental Injury, 80
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1467, 1467 (1990).
77. J.M. Davis & Regina Casper, Antipsychotic Drugs: Clinical Pharmacology and Thera-
peutic Use, 14 DRUGS 260 (1977).
78. Philip May, Prediction of Schizophrenic Patients' Response to Pharmacotherapy, in
PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY: A GENERATION OF PROGRESS (Morris A. Lipton et al. eds., 1977).
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under tort law than those who ignore the symptoms of their illness. Tort
law imposes a greater burden on those who discover specific knowledge of
risks.79 Increased knowledge of risks triggers a correlatively greater burden
to guard against those risks. Thus, an individual who discovers that he suf-
fers from an illness that poses risks to others owes an obligation to guard
against those risks that would not exist if the illness had not been discovered.
An example from the realm of physical illnesses is illustrative. An individ-
ual who is aware that he is HIV positive may be liable in tort for failing to
disclose this information to a sexual partner who becomes infected, where an
individual who has no reason to believe that he is HIV positive and transmits
the disease to a sexual partner would not be. 80 Similarly, an individual who
has received a diagnosis of manic-depression is put on notice of the risks of
the cyclical nature of this illness. Thus, as contrasted with an undiagnosed
manic-depressive, the person who has received the diagnosis owes a duty to
guard against the risk of accidental injury to others posed by this illness.
If tort law operates as an incentive for behavior, the objective standard of
care's indifference to treatment and harsh response to diagnosis seems un-
likely to encourage the diagnosis or treatment of mental or emotional
problems for either the seriously mentally ill or the walking wounded. A
more precise accommodation of the interests implicated by the tort system
requires a distinction in approach for those who sought treatment prior to
the injury producing conduct at issue and those who did not. The objective
standard encourages the mentally ill and walking wounded to behave
responsibly and seek treatment. It should remain as an incentive for those
who did not seek treatment prior to the injury-producing conduct at issue.
However, for those who have behaved responsibly and sought treatment
prior to the injury-producing conduct, the objective standard ignores or frus-
trates their efforts.
In the case of a defendant who initiated a regime of treatment for a mental
or emotional problem before the injury-producing conduct at issue, the ob-
jective standard of care should be modified in favor of a limited subjective
standard of care that evaluates the defendant's conduct in light of the treat-
ment received. If the defendant instituted treatment prior to the injury pro-
ducing conduct and complied fully with the treatment regime, the defendant
should not singularly bear the risk that the treatment has not to date been
efficacious. This result seems particularly appropriate in light of the emer-
gence of comparative negligence. 8 1
79. "The standard of the reasonable man requires only a minimum of attention, percep-
tion, memory, knowledge, intelligence, and judgment in order to recognize the existence of the
risk. If the actor has in fact more than the minimum of these qualities, he is required to
exercise these superior qualities that he has in a reasonable manner under the circumstances.
The standard becomes, in other words, that of a reasonable man with such superior qualities."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 289, cmt m.
80. Richard C. Schoenstein, Note, Standards of Conduct, Multiple Defendants and Full
Recovery in Tort Liability for the Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 18 HoF-
STRA L. REV. 37, 42 (1989).
81. Ellis, supra note 54, at 1097. An implicit assumption that underlies comparative neg-
ligence is that accidents are seldom caused exclusively by one party. Typically, it is a combina-
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This distinction draws implicit support from the case law. An exception
recognized in some jurisdictions to the rule that mental illness is not factored
into the standard of care for tort defendants is that sudden and unexpected
mental illness that affects the capacity of the defendant to conform to the
standards of a reasonable person excuses the defendant from being held to
the objective standard of care.82 Without regard to the psychological reality
this rule assumes about the occurrence of sudden and unexpected episodes of
mental illness, the rationale for this exception is germane to the modification
of the standard of care proposed. When the defendant has no notice of the
mental illness, there is nothing that the defendant can do to reduce the risk
posed by the mental illness. When the defendant has notice of the mental
illness, the defendant can act to reduce the risk. Notice of the illness, there-
fore, requires action to reduce that risk.8 3 This action may involve a constel-
lation of responses including avoiding certain behaviors (i.e. driving an
automobile) and securing treatment for the mental illness. If obtaining treat-
ment is a reasonable response to notice of the mental illness, then obtaining
treatment should be factored into the measurement of the reasonableness of
the defendant's conduct.
This distinction also draws implicit support from the use of evidence of
mental disability in another context. Evidence of the defendant's mental dis-
ability offered in mitigation of the death penalty must be considered by the
tion of activities that result in injury-producing behavior. Thus, it is inappropriate to visit
responsibility for the injury exclusively on one party. In the sense in which comparative negli-
gence is typically used, fault or negligence is apportioned among the parties whose conduct
proximately caused the injury. I use the concept here more broadly when I speak about the
patient not singularly bearing the risk that the treatment has not yet been efficacious. I am not
suggesting that a third party - the therapist or psychiatric researchers - has proximately
contributed to the plaintiff's injury in the way that term is used as a legal term of art. Rather,
I am suggesting that the patient who has pursued treatment in good faith which has not yet
been effective shares the responsibility, although not necessarily the blame, for that result with
the therapist who may not have chosen the best therapy and/or the researchers who may have
not discovered a more efficacious therapy. This line of reasoning raises a troubling problem for
the limited subjective standard of care. Should individuals for whom no effective treatment is
currently known, i.e., personality disorders, benefit from its application?
82. Breunig v. American Family Ins. Co., 173 N.W.2d 619 (Wis. 1970).
We think the statement that insanity is no defense is too broad when it is applied
to a negligence case where the driver is suddenly overcome without forewarning
by a mental disability or disorder which incapacitates him from conforming his
conduct to the standards of a reasonable man under like circumstances.
Id. at 624. See also Kuhn v. Zabotsky, 224 N.E.2d 137, 141 (1967) (denying insanity defense
to a civil cause of action).
83. There is, of course, an illogic built into the exception. It assumes that mental illness
has no debilitating affect on the capacity of the defendant to seek treatment. The proliferation
of a second generation of "in need of treatment" standards for civil commitment address men-
tally ill individuals who are in need of treatment and who are incapacitated and unable to
recognize that need as a result of their illness. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§ 574.034 (Vernon 1992); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05.020(1) (Wash. Supp. 1989). These
statutes assume the existence of a population of mentally ill individuals who are by reason of
their illness incapable of ascertaining their need for treatment. Cliff P. Stromberg & Alan A.




sentencing authority.84 Evidence of the defendant's mental disability is
more likely to be effective in mitigation of the death penalty when the de-
fendant received mental health care before committing the crime.85 This is
arguably because prior mental health care offers baseline evidence of the de-
fendant's mental illness outside the context of the instant proceeding. Alter-
natively, it may reflect a common sense construct used by jurors in
administration of the insanity defense.86 Those who sought help before their
current legal troubles may be considered less morally blameworthy than
those who did not seek help and caused harm. The use of a subjective stan-
dard of care for those who sought help before the tortious conduct at issue is
supported by a similar common sense construct.
Mentally ill and walking wounded defendants who instituted treatment
prior to their injury-producing conduct should be judged on a limited subjec-
tive standard of care that takes their efforts at treatment into account and
encourages them to use their knowledge of their illness to the greatest effect.
Since the proposed rule is designed to encourage treatment to reduce the risk
of accidental injury, the first conjunctive element of the test is that the de-
fendant must have instituted treatment in good faith prior to the injury-pro-
ducing conduct. If the defendant did not initiate treatment prior to the
injury-producing conduct, the defendant would not be judged on the modi-
fied standard of care but, instead, on the traditional objective standard of
care 87-no therapeutic efforts, no special therapeutic jurisprudence stan-
dard. The date the patient initiated treatment is readily verifiable since
records of patient care are required by professional regulation 8 and each
patient's treatment results in a paper trail of checks, receipts, and insurance
claim forms.
If the defendant initiated treatment but missed therapy sessions or failed
to take prescribed medication 9 or otherwise failed to comply fully with the
treatment regime, then the defendant should not be judged on the limited
subjective standard of care. Although not necessarily sufficient in and of
itself, patient cooperation is a necessary condition of efficacious treatment.
The limited subjective standard of care is intended to support compliance
84. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 327-28 (1989); Lockett v. United States, 438 U.S.
586, 605-08 (1978).
85. Lawrence White, The Mental Illness Defense in the Capital Penalty Hearing, 5
BEHAV. Sci. & L. 411, 417 (1987).
86. See Norman J. Finkel, Maligning and Misconstruing Juror's Insanity Verdicts: A Re-
buttal, 1 FORENSIC REP. 97, 107 (1988).
87. Even in the case of a defendant who sought treatment by making a timely appoint-
ment but was involved in an accident before treatment could begin, I would favor encouraging
treatment by application of the modified standard. This situation does admittedly present
other problems, such as lack of a baseline from which to gauge the defendant's conduct.
88. See, e.g., Tex. State Board of Examiners of Psychologists, 22 TEX. ADMIN. CODE
§ 465.22 (1987) (Record Maintenance) (requirement that psychologists maintain accurate, cur-
rent, and pertinent records of psychological services).
89. Stuyvesant Assoc. v. Doe, 534 A.2d 448, 450 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (de-
fendant-tenant, diagnosed as a schizophrenic, who failed to appear for regular injection of
prolixine decanate without providing an explanation, became delusional, damaged rental
dwelling, was subject to eviction and liable for property damage).
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with prescribed treatment. Only therapeutic good faith justifies application
of the modified standard of care.
An illustrative case is Johnson v. Lambotte.90 The defendant, Johnson,
was an involuntarily committed patient who had received electro-convulsive
treatment and thorazine for her "chronic schizophrenic state of paranoid
type." Johnson left the hospital unnoticed by the hospital staff, found a car
with the motor running, and drove it into Lambotte's car. Lambotte sued
for the resulting damages. The court did not consider Johnson's mental ill-
ness relevant under the traditional objective standard of care. Nor should
mental illness trigger the limited subjective standard of care, both because
she did not initiate treatment voluntarily91 and because she abandoned treat-
ment prematurely. Since no therapeutic good faith was shown, no special
therapeutic jurisprudence standard should be applied.
A more troubling problem is the individual who seeks treatment that is
unavailable due to the location or cost. Mental health care for the poor has
been largely unavailable.92 The incidence of increasing unemployment, lack
of adequate insurance, and managed care contributes to significant financial
limits on access to mental health care. There are cogent social policy rea-
sons for using the same modified standard of care for the person making a
good faith effort to obtain treatment that is financially unavailable and for
the person who has begun the process of treatment. This extension of the
limited subjective standard of care is, however, problematic. It will be more
difficult to document efforts to secure treatment and to judge each person's
ability to afford mental care.
Another difficult question is how to decide which treatments should trig-
ger the limited standard of care. A broad array of treatments and mental
health professionals exist. Tort law should not be indifferent to the defend-
ant's choice of treatment. Only those treatments that have been proven ef-
fective through rigorous scientific studies should trigger the limited standard
of care. The unknowns may dominate mental health care. A treatment cur-
rently labeled as fringe may one day justify recognition as a safe and effective
treatment of choice for certain mental disorders. Yet, if the therapeutic goal
of a limited standard of care is efficacious treatment, only resort to treat-
ments that have been shown to be effective in well-designed studies should be
supported by the limited subjective standard of care. Unproven treatments
are pursued at the risk of forgoing the beneficial application of the limited
standard of care. There is a developing literature on outcome research in
90. 363 P.2d 165 (Colo. 1961).
91. The distinction between voluntary and involuntary mental health care is admittedly
illusory. Janet A. Gilboy and John R. Schmidt, Voluntary Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill,
66 Nw. U. L. REV. 429, 430 (1971). Some voluntary patients seek care only in response to
threats of job loss, divorce, or involuntary hospitalization. Some involuntary patients receive
care on an involuntary basis because of concerns regarding their capacity to consent to volun-
tary care or fears that they will seek premature release.
92. BARBARA LERNER, THERAPY IN THE GHETTO: POLITICAL IMPOTENCE AND PER-
SONAL DISINTEGRATION 5 (1970); S. Garfield, Research in Client Variable in Psychotherapy,




health care precipitated by cost conscious third party payers - insurance
companies and governmental entities. 93 The same concerns with efficacious
outcomes are germane to therapeutic jurisprudence and provide a body of
research from which consumers of health care and tort law may draw.
If the judge or jury finds that the first element of the test (institution of
efficacious treatment prior to the injury producing conduct) has been satis-
fied, it should then proceed to the second prong of the test and consider the
impact of the defendant's mental or emotional problems and treatment on
the defendant's conduct. The second prong of the test asks the fact finder to
decide whether the defendant performed as well as society is entitled to ex-
pect such a person to behave, considering their mental or emotional problem
and the treatment obtained. Tort law considers whether a blind defendant
behaved as well as society should expect a blind person to behave under the
circumstances. 94 Similarly, tort law should consider whether a defendant
with a mental or emotional problem behaved as well as society should expect
a person to behave given the mental or emotional problems and treatment
obtained. If the defendant has performed as well as society should reason-
ably expect given the defendant's mental and emotional problems and the
treatment received, then the defendant has met the modified standard of
care.
The limited subjective standard of care should not be misconstrued as a
grant of immunity to the mentally ill and walking wounded. Its application
will not invariably result in a lowered expectation for the defendant's behav-
ior. Consider the case of a person who has completed a course of therapy for
stress management. 95 The goal of stress management is to teach individuals
to manage their physiological and psychological reactions to stressful situa-
tions. One year later, the person experiences significant stress but does not
use the stress management techniques learned. As a consequence, the per-
son fails to concentrate while driving and causes a collision. An evaluation
of that person's behavior under the limited subjective standard would ask
whether the defendant behaved as well as society should expect given the
mental or emotional problem and the treatment received. Here the treat-
ment was directed to identify and deal constructively with stress. Given the
defendant's knowledge of stress management techniques, the defendant has
not behaved as prudently as should be expected and would not escape liabil-
ity under the limited subjective standard of care.
The use of a subjective standard of care for those mentally ill and walking
wounded who sought treatment prior to the alleged tortious conduct avoids
93. See, e.g., Oregon Health Services Commission, The 1991 Prioritization of Health
Services.
94. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283(c) (1965). "If the actor is ill or other-
wise physically disabled, the standard of conduct to which he must conform to avoid being
negligent is that of a reasonable man under like disability." Id.
95. I am indebted to Grant Morris for suggesting this problem. For a review of the out-
come research on stress management, see Lawrence J. Murphy, Occupational Stress Manage-
ment: A Review and Appraisal, 57 J. OCcuP. MED. 1, 7 (1984). The strategies tested include
biofeedback, meditation, muscle relaxation, and cognitive restructuring.
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the criticism often leveled at a subjective standard of care. The argument
that a uniform, predictable standard will evaporate and yield an infinite
number of unworkable, individualized standards is not germane in these cir-
cumstances for three reasons: (1) the number of individuals who may invoke
this standard is capped; (2) there is a disincentive to invoke the standard;
and (3) there are pre-exisiting standards to measure the behavior of these
individuals. The number of individuals who will have sought efficacious
mental health care prior to the injury producing conduct is self limited. The
floodgates of criticism remain closed. The rule is designed to encourage pre-
accident treatment to reduce the risk of accidental injury. Only those who
instituted efficacious treatment prior to the injury producing conduct could
invoke this rule.
The floodgates concern is also ameliorated by a disincentive to invoke this
modified standard. Invocation of this modified standard requires public ad-
mission of treatment for a mental or emotional problem and public disclo-
sure of confidential therapist-patient communications. People labelled as
mentally ill face a broad array of prejudices and immutable stereotypes.96
Thus a motorist who is sued for negligent driving may be unwilling to en-
gage in a public disclosure of this sort to defend the claim. 97 An attorney or
physician who is sued for malpractice may be unwilling to risk the impact of
that admission as a cost of defending the claim.
The concern that a modified standard presents insuperable problems of
diagnosis and application of an individualized standard is also misplaced.
Diagnosis of individuals who invoke the modified standard and assessment
of their individual capacities is aided by the requirement that they have re-
ceived treatment prior to the injury-producing conduct when no secondary
gain was present. Again, these individuals are self-defined by the act of seek-
ing mental health care prior to the tortious conduct at issue. Also, there is a
professionally determined pre-accident baseline that may be used to measure
the defendant's conduct.
The fear that people may seek treatment as a boiler plate defense against
tort liability for unplanned future acts of negligence is unjustified. If the
person seeking treatment has mental health problems that may benefit from
treatment and actually complies with the prescribed treatment, a therapeutic
result accrues regardless of the reason. This treatment may reduce the risk
of injury and advance the accident reduction goal of tort law and therapeutic
jurisprudence. If the person seeking treatment has no mental health
problems that may benefit from treatment, a professionally determined base-
line exists to defeat application of the limited subjective standard of care.
The fear that individuals may plan to commit a tort and use prior initia-
tion of treatment as a defense is also unjustified for two reasons. First, the
96. Perlin, supra note 31.
97. There are certainly instances in which plaintiffs appear to have foregone claims for
psychological injuries to avoid the disclosure of mental health records. See, e.g., Martin v.
Martelli, 554 N.Y.S.2d 787, 789 (1990) (holding that it would be imprudent to order release of




treatment may ameliorate the risk of the planned tortious conduct. Treat-
ment may provide a therapeutic outlet for the thoughts or feelings that un-
derlay the planned tort. Second, planned tortious conduct is an intentional
tort, not a negligent tort. Although the defendant's mental or emotional
problems are irrelevant to the standard of care in negligence actions, they are
relevant in the case of intentional torts.98 The defendant's mental or emo-
tional problems are relevant to evaluate the defendant's intent to bring about
a particular result or to be substantially certain that it will result. Thus,
people planning tortious conduct who purposefully institute treatment to lay
the groundwork for a later defense may be dissuaded from engaging in the
planned tortious conduct and gain no legal advantage under the subjective
standard.
An individualized standard factoring mental illness into the evaluation of
conduct is generally permitted for plaintiffs on the issue of contributory neg-
ligence. 99 Contrary to the fears articulated about administering a civil in-
sanity defense, the individualized standard for the contributory negligence of
plaintiffs has not been reported to present insuperable problems. This may
be relevant evidence that a limited subjective standard for mentally ill and
walking wounded defendants who sought treatment prior to the tortious
conduct would also not present insuperable problems.
IV. CONCLUSION
There is much to be said in favor of a limited subjective standard of care
for the mentally ill and walking wounded who initiate treatment prior to the
injury-producing conduct. Such a standard offers the potential to implement
the accident reduction goal shared by tort law and therapeutic jurisprudence
on a grand scale. The limited subjective standard has a limited downside
risk since the floodgates are closed as of the date of the injury-producing
conduct. And, the limited subjective standard of care has a built in baseline
for measuring the defendant's conduct that should make its application eas-
ier and provide a disincentive for inappropriate use.
A limited subjective standard of care for the mentally ill and walking
wounded who initiated treatment prior to the alleged tortious conduct may
be convincing on therapeutic jurisprudence grounds and may deflect the ar-
guments traditionally used to justify the objective standard of care. How-
98. In the case of torts such as battery that have a specific intent requirement, the exist-
ence of mental illness is a relevant consideration in the defendant's capacity to form that in-
tent. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 135, at
1073 (5th ed. 1984).
99. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 464 (1965) ("Unless the actor is a child or
insane person, the standard of conduct to which he must conform for his own protection is
that of a reasonable person under like circumstances."); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 178 n.39 (5th ed. 1984) ("The great majority of
courts in the contributory negligence context apply a lower standard of care and consider the
plaintiff's incapacity as only one of the 'circumstances' to be considered in judging the quality
of his conduct."). See also Curran, supra note 30, at 63 (citing seven pre-RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS cases, five of which apply a subjective standard for contributory negligence
and two which do not).
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ever, even if one is convinced by these arguments, there may be other
reasons to challenge this proposal for a limited subjective standard of care.
This proposal, which seeks to implement a modified standard of care to re-
duce the rate of injury, may be attacked as utilitarian. Utilitarian reasoning
is vulnerable both because of its consequentalist approach and its unexplored
empirical premises. The consequentalist concern is that utilitarianism is a
result oriented approach focused on "maximized happiness"00 that excludes
consideration of other competing values.101 Some critics have viewed thera-
peutic jurisprudence as a utilitarian-based reasoning that measures all legal
decisions by their therapeutic consequences. Therapeutic jurisprudence has,
however, moved quickly to counter this consequentialist criticism by recog-
nizing that therapeutic consequences are not the only important concern in
legal decisionmaking, but only one of a competing set of concerns. 102
Whether this pragmatic reformulation will result in a more careful balancing
of interests must await future judgment.
A specific example of this consequentialist concern with therapeutic juris-
prudence in the case of a therapeutically based standard of care for the men-
tally ill and walking wounded is the impact of that standard of care on
another normative value, compensation. Even if a limited subjective stan-
dard of care encourages treatment, it denies compensation to plaintiffs in-
jured through no fault of their own.10 3 Thus, even if a limited subjective
standard of care encourages a greater level of safety in some cases, that bene-
fit must be balanced against denying compensation to some injured plaintiffs.
Compensation is, however, a relativist rather than an absolute concern of
tort law. Not all injured plaintiffs are compensated by tort law. Plaintiffs
seriously injured by conduct not thought to be in need of deterrence are not
offered compensation by tort law. More specifically, the goal of compensa-
tion is subserved for plaintiffs injured by physically incapacitated defendants
whose conduct is measured against those who are similarly disabled.
Thus, the fact that one consequence of the limited subjective standard of
care for the mentally ill and the walking wounded will be to deny compensa-
tion to injured plaintiffs should not, by itself, result in a rejection of the rule.
The choice necessitates a careful balancing of interests. This balancing
should not occur in the abstract. Rather, it requires a precise analysis of the
cost of injuries avoided against the cost of injuries not compensated. The
100. See JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION 2 (Athlone P. London 1970) (1789) (discussing the utilitarianism approach).
101. H.L.A. Hart, Between Utility and Rights, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 828, 828 (1979). Hart
identifies two politically separate criticisms of utilitarianism. American conservatives criticize
utilitarianism for its ignorance of "the moral importance of the separateness or distinctiveness
of human persons." Id See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 46-53 (1971) (discussing
moral theory). American liberals criticize utilitarianism for its denial of the moral title to
equal concern and respect. Hart, supra at 828. Leonard G. Ratner, The Utilitarian Impera-
tive: Autonomy, Reciprocity, and Revolution, 12 HOrSTRA L. REV. 723, 749-55 (1984).
102. WEXLER & WINICK, supra note 1.
103. As noted earlier, the argument that any significant number of injuries occur without
shared responsibility for the result may be a chimera. Yet, even if in a small number of cases,




posture of this question highlights another flaw in utilitarian based
reasoning.
Utilitarian reasoning is vulnerable because it often assumes, without em-
pirical examination, that a legal rule will result in a particular societal conse-
quence. If a rule is based on a consequentialist rationale (i.e., that we should
impose stiff criminal sentences on violent criminals to deter violent crime),
empirical examination of the consequence of rule (i.e., the relationship be-
tween the severity of punishment and the rate of violent crime) is obligatory.
Similarly, the argument for a therapeutic jurisprudence based on the limited
subjective standard of care for mentally ill tort defendants turns on a series
of empirically verifiable links. These empirically verifiable links include an
assumption that tort law influences behavior, that mental or emotional
problems play a causative role in tortious conduct, and that safe and effective
treatment exists for mental or emotional problems. If any of these empirical
premises is false, then therapeutic jurisprudence does not support the appli-
cation of a limited subjective standard of care for mentally ill and walking
wounded tort defendants.
The wisdom of this proposal thus returns to its original premise. Should
tort law attempt to deter unsafe behavior? Perhaps it should not. Yet, if it
should seek to do so effectively, tort law should not ignore the psychological
reality of accident causation and the therapeutic potential of the standard of
care.
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